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Parol Evidence Rules and the 
Mechanics of Choice
Gregory Klass*
Scholars have to date paid relatively little attention to the rules 
for deciding when a writing is integrated. These integration rules, 
however, are as dark and full of subtle difficulties as are other parts 
of parol evidence rules. As a way of thinking about Hanoch Dagan 
and Michael Heller’s The Choice Theory of Contracts, this Article 
suggests we would do better with tailored integration rules for two 
transaction types. In negotiated contracts between firms, courts 
should apply a hard express integration rule, requiring firms to say 
when they intend a writing to be integrated. In consumer contracts, 
standard terms should automatically be integrated against consumer-
side communications, and never integrated against a business’s 
communications. The argument for each rule rests on the ways parties 
make and express contractual choices in these types of transactions. 
Whereas Dagan and Heller emphasize the different values at stake in 
different spheres of contracting, differences among parties’ capacities 
for choice — or the “mechanics of choice” — are at least as important.
IntroductIon
Contractual obligations are chosen obligations. They are chosen in two senses. 
First, each party must choose to enter into an agreement that generates the 
contractual obligations. Each must assent to the deal. Second, the parties have 
the ability to choose the terms of their agreement, and thereby determine the 
content of their contractual obligations. The parties can decide what the deal is.
* Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. This Article was presented at the Freedom, Choice, and Contract 
Conference, Columbia Law School, October 13-14, 2017, and benefited from 
the questions and feedback I received there.
 Cite as: Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 
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Many rules of contract law address how parties make those choices. 
Some of those rules are about parties’ choice to enter into a legally binding 
agreement. These include rules governing offer and acceptance, implied-in-
fact contracts, Statutes of Frauds, and formation defenses. Other rules are 
about how parties choose terms. Examples include hierarchies of interpretive 
evidence, plain meaning rules, default obligations, and contra proferentem. 
Taken as a whole, these rules do two things: they tell adjudicators how to 
decide whether and how parties have exercised their power to choose, and 
they inform sophisticated parties what they must do to exercise a legally 
effective choice.
This Article argues that contract theorists — scholars exploring the normative 
basis of contract law — should pay more attention to how contracting parties 
make choices and to how the law determines the choices they have made. Or 
as I put the point below, theorists should pay attention both to the mechanics 
of choice and to legal mechanisms for choosing. I make the case by exploring 
the relevance of both to Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller’s choice theory 
of contracts.1 Dagan and Heller argue that the core value of contract law is to 
enable party choice. Yet they pay little attention to the mechanics of choice 
or legal mechanisms for choosing. That neglect, I argue, renders their theory 
incomplete, and at times Panglossian.
I support that claim through a close examination of one mechanism of 
contractual choice: the parol evidence rule. When parties reduce their agreement 
to writing, courts sometimes treat that writing as dispositive of the terms in it, 
or even of the parties’ agreement as a whole. In common law jurisdictions, the 
primary rule for determining when a writing is given special evidentiary weight 
is the parol evidence rule. The term “parol evidence” refers to evidence of the 
parties’ agreement other than the writing at issue. A writing that operates to 
exclude parol evidence of terms is “integrated.” Parol evidence rules determine 
when writings are integrated and when if ever parol evidence may be used 
to contradict, supplement, and sometimes interpret the terms contained in an 
integrated writing.
My analysis of parol evidence rules starts from Dagan and Heller’s suggestion 
that we do better with different laws of contracts for different transaction 
types, or “spheres of contract.” Examples of such spheres include agreements 
between firms, employment contracts, consumer contracts and intra-family 
agreements. I examine how, starting from a clean slate, we might design a 
parol evidence rule for each of two such spheres: negotiated contracts between 
firms and consumer contracts. Neither of the resulting parol evidence rules 
corresponds to the rules one finds in the case law or treatises. For negotiated 
1 hanoch Dagan & Michael heller, The choice Theory of conTracTs (2017).
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contracts between firms, the analysis suggests a hard, strict integration rule, 
requiring firms to say when they intend a writing to be integrated and treating 
such expressions as dispositive. For consumer contracts, I argue for automatic 
integration of standard terms against consumer-side parol communications 
together with a mandatory rule that standard terms are not integrated against 
a business’s parol representations or promises. The argument for each rule 
relies in part on the social values at stake in each sphere. But the differences 
between the recommended rules reflect the different mechanics of choice 
in each — how in each sphere parties can and do exercise their power to 
choose terms. Whereas Dagan and Heller argue that local rules of contract 
law should be crafted in light of “the normative concerns driving different 
contract types,”2 this Article demonstrates that the mechanics and available 
mechanisms of choice are at least as important.
Along the way, this Article makes several other contributions. I reject 
the English Law Review Commission’s argument that the parol evidence 
rule is not a separate rule of law, but a specific application of the general 
principles of contract law. I provide an analysis of parol evidence rules that 
emphasizes rules for integration, an oft overlooked element of those rules. I 
argue that contemporary formalist scholars have not been formalist enough 
in their thinking about integration in contracts between firms. And I suggest 
an argument for a largely choice-independent form of parol evidence rule 
for consumer contracts.
Part I introduces Dagan and Heller’s choice theory, together with the ideas 
of the mechanics of choice and legal mechanisms for choosing. Part II provides 
an overview of existing parol evidence rules and the role of integration by 
way of a critical analysis of the English Law Review Commission’s 1986 
report on the rule. Part III argues that the mechanics of choice in two types 
of transactions, negotiated contracts between firms and consumer contracts, 
recommend different integration rules for each. The Conclusion draws a 
few lessons, both for Dagan and Heller’s choice theory and contract theory 
more generally.
I. the choIce theory, the MechanIcs of choIce,  
and MechanIsMs for choosIng
At least since the Legal Realists’ attack on Langdell, English-language legal 
theorists have shown an affinity for lapsarian narratives. In The Choice Theory 
of Contract, Dagan and Heller blame contract law’s fall from an earlier, more 
2 Id. at 7.
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Edenic state on Samuel Williston. Williston’s original sin was to attempt to 
construct a unified theory of contract law, taking commercial contracts as the 
paradigm and ignoring the many differences in the laws that governed other 
types of transactions. “This distinctive, early twentieth-century American 
trajectory elevated commercial transactions to the core of contract, and, as a 
byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of diverse contract types.”3 
Dagan and Heller suggest that many contracts scholars remain captive to this 
Willistonian worldview, seeking out unifying principles and trying to craft 
rules of general applicability.4 In fact, Dagan and Heller argue, there are many 
different types, or “spheres,” of contractual transactions. Examples include 
agreements between businesses of various types, employment relationships, 
consumer transactions, and agreements among family members. Because 
different spheres implicate different values, the law should not treat all 
alike. More specifically, the sometimes competing values of community and 
efficiency take on different forms and receive different weights depending on 
the sphere of contracting. A universal law of contract cannot take account of 
the specific mix of values at stake in each sphere. We should not, therefore, 
seek one big law of contract, but should construct local contract laws for the 
various spheres of contracting.
In addition to this intersphere legal pluralism, Dagan and Heller advocate 
for intrasphere pluralism of contract types and terms. No matter the social 
values at stake in one or another sphere, parties’ autonomous choice should 
remain a guiding principle in all spheres. Party autonomy is valuable for at 
least two reasons. First, and most familiarly, autonomous choice is a good in 
itself. Second, party autonomy addresses the fact that even within a single 
3 Dagan & heller, supra note 1, at 8. It is worth noting that Book V of the 
first edition of Williston’s treatise, which occupies the bulk of Volume Two, 
was devoted to “Particular Classes of Contract.” These included chapters on 
Contracts for the Sale of Land, Contracts for the Sale of Personal Property, 
Contracts of Employment and Contracts to Marry, Contracts of Bailment and 
of Innkeepers, Contracts of Affreightment, Bills of Exchange and Promissory 
Notes, and Contracts of Suretyship. 5 saMuel WillisTon, The laW of conTracTs 
§ 633, 1225 (1924).
4 Dagan and Heller are not the first to suggest different contract laws for different 
spheres of contracting. See, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and 
Forum and the Widening Gulf Between “Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” 
Contracts in the UCC, 75 Wash. u. l.q. 243 (1997); Ethan J. Leib, On 
Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 
24 quinnipiac l. rev. 1 (2005); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert 
E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 
cornell l. rev. 23 (2014).
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sphere there is no one right way to balance competing values. Party choice 
provides a means of resolving conflicts between our normative commitments.5
Dagan and Heller suggest that the law should enable intrasphere choice in 
two ways. First, the law should ensure that within any given sphere there is a 
choice among “contract types” — pre-established or off-the-rack transaction 
structures.6 Predefined contract types promote efficiency by reducing transaction 
costs. But they do more than that. Contract types also enhance autonomy by 
providing socially recognized relational forms that embody various mixes 
of values and shared cultural meanings, thereby generating new meaningful 
forms of acting together.7 Second, autonomy requires also that the parties 
be granted the power to make alterations to the off-the-rack contract types 
society offers. A commitment to voluntariness “implies that people should 
generally be able to choose not only among various contract types, but also 
terms within each.”8
Although Dagan and Heller say a lot about the value of choice, they do 
not say much about how parties make such choices. There are two salient 
dimensions to how contracting parties exercise their powers of choice. The 
first is parties’ baseline abilities to choose, and the conditions under which 
they are able to make informed, autonomous and therefore valuable choices. 
I will call this the “mechanics of choice.” 
Although Dagan and Heller do not spend many pages on the topic, they 
do not ignore the mechanics of choice. For example:
Sometimes, cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political economy 
reasons imply that more choice may actually reduce freedom. But 
those circumstances will be local to certain contract types or market 
structures, not universal to contract as a whole. Frankly, we just don’t 
know in which contexts the probable effects of these concerns are 
significant enough to justify limiting multiplicity.9
5 Dagan & heller, supra note 1, at 80.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 76 (“[W]hen contract law offers us multiple contract types, it participates 
in the ongoing social production of stable categories of human interaction by 
consolidating people’s expectations of themselves and others. In this, law enlarges 
the range of valuable options available to us.”).
8 Id. at 109.
9 Id. at 127. See also id. at 74 (“The impediments to secure contracting often 
depend on the specific features of the particular contract type and therefore each 
type requires its own legal facilitation.”), 106-07 (suggesting that how people 
choose and the design of choice mechanisms “should be . . . . a major focus of 
behavioral and institutional economics studies of contract law”).
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Dagan and Heller also argue that the mechanics of consumer choice suggest 
mandatory restrictions on businesses’ ability to include hard-to-read terms 
like arbitration clauses or class-action waivers. “[C]hoice theory implies that 
[these terms’] inclusion in consumer contracts should not be able to upset 
consumers’ background expectation of relatively unimpeded access to courts 
or to reasonably equivalent procedures for dispute resolution.”10
Dagan and Heller have less to say about a second dimension of how 
parties choose, which I will call the “mechanisms of choice.” These are the 
tools that the law gives parties for exercising their power to choose, which 
Ian Ayres has called “altering rules.”11 Consider, for example, Dagan and 
Heller’s positive view of section 17.42 of Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices 
and Consumer Protection Act, which empowers consumers to waive the Act’s 
protections.12 Dagan and Heller favor the opt-out provision, as “people should, 
in some circumstances, be able to choose between purchasing a good with 
the protections of consumer transaction law or by using sales law.”13 They do 
not discuss, however, what a consumer must do to opt out of such protections 
— the mechanisms needed to ensure a fully informed and valuable choice.
It is worth paying attention to those details. Section 17.42 requires that 
“(1) the waiver is in writing and is signed by the consumer; (2) the consumer 
is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position; and (3) the consumer is 
represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquiring the goods or services.”14 
It requires that the consumer’s counsel be independent of the business. And 
it requires that the waiver be:
(1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in size; (2) 
identified by the heading “Waiver of Consumer Rights,” or words of 
similar meaning; and (3) in substantially the following form: “I waive 
my rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection 
Act, Section 17.41 et seq., Business & Commerce Code, a law that 
gives consumers special rights and protections. After consultation with 
an attorney of my own selection, I voluntarily consent to this waiver.”15
10 Id. at 112.
11 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 
yale l.J. 2032 (2012).
12 Tex. Bus. coM. coDe ann. § 17.42 (West 2017). 
13 Dagan & heller, supra note 1, at 71. See also id. at 82 (advocating that consumers 
be able to “make their own (individual) choices between the ‘souk’ or ‘bazaar’ 
mode of ‘as is’ contracting and the ‘errands’ model of consumer protection law”).
14 Tex. Bus. coM. coDe ann. § 17.42(a) (West 2017). 
15 Id. at §§ 17.42(b) & (c).
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This choice mechanism makes perfect sense given the mechanics of consumer 
choice — the difficulty of ensuring informed consumer agreement to a term such 
as this. The Texas legislature appears to have been concerned that a consumer 
might assent to waive the Act’s protections without fully understanding what 
she was giving up, as consumers regularly assent to unread standard terms. 
The resulting mechanism of choice, however, is enormously expensive to use. 
One might guess that few if any Texans will exercise this power of choice 
the Texas legislature has granted them.
The remainder of this Article examines one of the most important mechanisms 
of choice in U.S. contract law: parol evidence rules. A parol evidence rule 
provides mechanisms of contractual choice in two ways. First, if a writing 
is integrated, the rule limits the evidence an adjudicator may consider when 
deciding what terms parties have chosen. In this way, parol evidence rules 
determine how parties can exercise their legal power to choose terms: sometimes 
they must express that choice in a writing. Second, modern parol evidence 
rules treat integration as itself a matter of choice: A writing is integrated only 
if the parties have agreed that it shall be a final statement of some or all terms 
of their agreement. U.S. courts have crafted several rules for deciding when 
parties have made that choice. That is, they have provided parties with various 
mechanisms for exercising the choice to integrate a writing.
It is widely recognized that different U.S. jurisdictions employ different 
parol evidence rules. Most accounts of those rules, however, describe one parol 
evidence rule for all contracts. Dagan and Heller’s choice theory suggests a 
different approach. Perhaps there is not, or should not be, one big parol evidence 
rule, but local parol evidence rules for distinct spheres of contracting. Part III 
explores that idea, focusing on two spheres of contracting: negotiated contracts 
between firms and consumer contracts. Before getting there, however, it is 
necessary to say a few words about parol evidence rules generally.
II. Parol evIdence rules: the BasIcs
It is no easy thing to summarize the parol evidence rules found in the common 
law of contracts. The reasons are manifold. Parol evidence rules are complex, 
with multiple moving parts. Judicial articulations of the rules often bear traces 
of older doctrines modern rules were meant to supplant. There are important 
differences between parol evidence rules in different jurisdictions, and often 
among articulations of the rule in a single jurisdiction. And applications 
of the rules often involve fact-specific judgments that make it difficult to 
draw broad conclusions from individual holdings. This Part nonetheless 
attempts to provide a basic introduction. I distinguish three core elements of 
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parol evidence rules, which I call the “terms component,” the “interpretive 
component,” and the “integration component.” The focus of this Article is on 
the integration components of U.S. parol evidence rules. I provide an analysis 
of integration rules generally by way of a critical examination of the English 
Law Commission’s 1986 report on the parol evidence rule.
All modern parol evidence rules share a basic structure. A finding that a 
writing is integrated limits, in one way or another, the evidence an adjudicator 
may consider to determine the content of the parties’ agreement. A partially 
integrated writing excludes parol evidence of terms contrary to those in the 
writing; a completely integrated writing excludes parol evidence of terms 
contrary or in addition to those in the writing.16 I call this the “terms component” 
of a parol evidence rule, as it cuts off evidence of contrary or additional terms. 
Some courts and commentators have suggested that integration should also 
limit the types of evidence an adjudicator may consider when interpreting 
the words in the writing.17 More specifically, they have argued that except in 
cases of ambiguity, the words in an integrated writing should be interpreted 
according to their plain meaning, without the aid of extrinsic evidence. I call 
this the “interpretive component” of a parol evidence rule. The details of both 
terms components and interpretive components of parol evidence rules differ 
across U.S. jurisdictions.18
Interesting and important as these sub-rules are, I want to focus on a 
third component of parol evidence rules: the rule for determining whether a 
contractual writing is integrated, and if so, whether partially or completely. I 
will call this the “integration component” or “integration rule.”
There is today broad agreement that a writing is integrated if and only if 
the parties together intended that it would serve a final statement of some or 
all terms of their agreement.19 As Williston put the point, “The parol evidence 
16 resTaTeMenT (seconD) of conTracTs §§ 215-16 (aM. laW insT. 1981).
17 This position is often associated with Williston. See 2 WillisTon, supra note 
3, at §§ 604, 605 & 607, 1162-64, 1167-71 (advocating different standards of 
interpretation for informal contracts and integrated writings).
18 See 2 e. allan farnsWorTh, farnsWorTh on conTracTs § 7.3, 218-19 (3d ed. 
2004) (discussing the meaning of “consistent” in the parol evidence rule); id. 
at § 7.12, 292-304 (discussing judicial approaches to interpreting integrated 
agreements).
19 Among U.S. scholars, the claim dates back at least to Wigmore, who emphasized 
that the integration question “is a question of the nature of the act and of the 
party’s intention to embody it solely in the writing.” 4 John henry WigMore, 
a TreaTise on The sysTeM of eviDence in Trials aT coMMon laW § 2427, 3423 
(1905). Judicial expressions of the idea can be found even earlier. Thus in an 
1859 case in the Court of the Exchequer, Lord Pollock held that the defendant 
2019] Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice 465
rule does not apply to every contract of which there is written evidence, but 
only applies where the parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, and agree 
or intend that that writing shall be their agreement.”20 Similarly for Arthur 
Corbin, a writing is integrated when the parties “have both assented [to it] as 
the complete and accurate integration of that contract.”21 Integration, everyone 
today concurs, is a matter of party agreement.
In a 1986 report on the parol evidence rule, the English Law Review 
Commission suggested that it follows from the agreement-based understanding 
of integration that there is in fact no such thing as a parol evidence rule.
[A]lthough a proposition of law can be stated which can be described 
as the “parol evidence rule” it is not a rule of law which, correctly 
applied, could lead to evidence being unjustly excluded. Rather, it 
is a proposition of law which is no more than a circular statement: 
when it is proved or admitted that the parties to a contract intended 
that all the express terms of their agreement should be recorded in 
a particular document or documents, evidence will be inadmissible 
(because irrelevant) if it is tendered only for the purpose of adding 
to, varying, subtracting from or contradicting the express terms of a 
contract. We have considerable doubts whether such a proposition 
should properly be characterized as a “rule” at all.22
If integration is merely one contract term among others, then what has 
traditionally been called the “parol evidence rule” is in fact no more than a 
specific application of general principles of contract law. It is not the existence 
of the writing that matters, but the content of the parties’ agreement, as with 
any other contract term. “The conclusion which emerges . . . [i]s that there is 
no rule of law that evidence is rendered inadmissible or is to be ignored solely 
because a document exists which looks like a complete contract. Whether it 
could introduce parol evidence that a bill of sale had been given as security for 
an earlier loan, reasoning:
The jury have found that it was agreed to give the bill of sale; they have 
not found, nor does it appear to us, that the writing was intended to contain 
the whole agreement, and we are of opinion that the rule relied on by the 
plaintiffs only applies where the parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, 
and agree or intend that that writing shall be their agreement.
 Harris v. Rickett (1859) 157 Eng. Rep. 734, 737.
20 2 WillisTon, supra note 3, at § 633, 1225.
21 Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 yale l.J. 603, 603 (1944).
22 laW coMMission, laW of conTracT: The parol eviDence rule, 1986, Cmnd. 
9700, § 2.7, at 8 (UK) (emphasis in the original, footnotes omitted).
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is a complete contract depends upon the intentions of the parties, objectively 
judged, and not on any rule of law.”23
The Law Commission’s reasoning is flawed. An agreement-based 
understanding of integration does not entail that there is no parol evidence 
rule — that anything we might call “the parol evidence rule” is just a specific 
application of general principles of contract law. There are at least three reasons 
why this is so. Identifying them will provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the nature of integration rules and how they function as mechanisms of choice.
First, the fact that parties have the power to contract for one or another 
type of term is not a given, but is itself a rule of law. Contract law sets a host 
of mandatory limits on parties’ ability to contract. A contract for murder 
will not be enforced. An employer and employee do not have the power to 
contract for a salary below the minimum wage, or to contract out of safety 
or antidiscrimination laws. A landlord and residential tenant do not have the 
power to contract out of the implied warranty of habitability. The power to 
contract for one or another term is not a given. It exists because the law grants 
persons that power.
This is all the more so with respect to a term like integration. Many 
contract terms specify first-order obligations — obligations whose non-
performance would constitute a breach.24 When parties agree to integrate 
a writing, however, they are doing something very different. Rather than 
undertaking new obligations, they are agreeing to alter the rules that govern 
how their obligations will be determined. Integration is a framework term, 
comparable to a choice of law clause, a liquidated damages clause, or an 
arbitration clause. Framework terms do not specify the parties’ first-order 
performance obligations, but determine how those obligations can be undertaken, 
how they will be construed, the consequences of their breach, who will 
adjudicate disputes, and the like.25
The point of noticing this difference is that the reasons for extending 
freedom of contract with respect to first-order terms need not apply pari 
passu to framework terms. Limits on parties’ ability to contract for first-
23 Id. at § 2.16, 13 (emphasis in the original).
24 In addition to first-order obligations, a contract might provide for first-order 
permissions, powers and other jural relations. I ignore these additional types of 
contract terms only for the sake of simplicity.
25 My distinction between first-order and framework terms is comparable to Jody 
Kraus and Robert Scott’s between parties’ contractual ends — the parties’ 
proximate reasons for entering into the transaction — and their contractual 
means — the legal tools parties use to accomplish those ends. Jody S. Kraus & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 
n.y.u. l. rev. 1023, 1026 (2009).
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order obligations are often reasonably described as one or another form of 
parentalism. Limits on parties’ ability to contract for alternative framework 
rules — such as rules governing the evidence a court will consider to determine 
just what the parties agreed to — are more likely to reflect the social interests 
in enforcement, interests that individual parties do not get to decide.
It is not difficult to imagine a legal world in which contracting parties 
do not have the power to specify a writing’s evidentiary value. Tort law 
does not give parties the power to determine what evidence of fraudulent 
misrepresentation a court may consider.26 Everything always counts. At the 
other end of the spectrum, the law of wills mandates that the only words 
that matter when determining a decedent’s bequests are those contained in 
her properly executed last will and testament.27 Only the writing counts, no 
matter what the testator might say. And prior to the emergence of agreement-
based parol evidence rules, the best evidence rule automatically excluded oral 
evidence of terms contrary to those in contractual writings, without giving 
parties the ability to choose otherwise.28 The parol evidence rule does not 
simply flow from general principles of contractual freedom. It represents 
a legal decision to grant to parties the power to determine a writing’s legal 
effects. That makes it a rule of law.
The second error in the Law Commission’s reasoning is its failure to 
recognize that the legal effects of an agreement to integrate might extend beyond 
the content of that agreement.29 The existence of both a terms component and 
an interpretive component in U.S. parol evidence rules illustrates the idea. 
An agreement to integrate is an agreement that a writing shall be the final 
statement of some or all terms. It is an agreement to the terms component. 
26 See Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and 
Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 val. u. l. rev. 485 (1999).
27 Wigmore, who was one of the first to formulate the agreement-based integration 
rules for contractual writings, emphasized that wills and several other types of 
writings were integrated as a matter of law. See WigMore, supra note 19, at § 
2452, 3461-63.
28 The best evidence rule established an evidentiary hierarchy: written evidence, 
which was commonly under seal, could not be contradicted by oral evidence. 
See generally John William Salmond, The Superiority of Written Evidence, 6 
laW q. rev. 75 (1890).
29 This is an example of the importance of attending to the distinction between 
the interpretation of a contractual agreement — determining its meaning – and 
the construction of that agreement — determining its legal effect. See Gregory 
Klass, Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction Right, 18 geo. J. l. & puB. pol’y (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3347122.
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The agreement to integrate might also, however, trigger a plain meaning rule 
of interpretation — whether or not the parties have agreed to that interpretive 
component. The interpretive rule results from the parties’ agreement to integrate, 
but might not be something the parties agreed to.
One might respond to the above point by arguing that interpretive components 
of parol evidence rules are designed to capture how most parties expect or want 
their integrated writing to be interpreted, and therefore are also agreement-
based. Williston, for example, argues that a plain meaning rule reflects how 
most parties think about an integrated writing.
In an ordinary oral contract or one made by correspondence, the minds 
of the parties are not primarily addressed to the symbols which they 
are using; they are considering the things for which the symbols stand. 
Where, however, they incorporate their agreement into a writing they 
have attempted more than to assent by means of symbols to certain 
things, they have assented to the writing as the adequate expression 
of the things to which they agree.30
If most parties who produce integrated writings expect or prefer that those 
writings be interpreted according to their plain meaning, then a plain meaning 
interpretation component is designed in a way to capture their intentions or 
agreement.
The above response misses the mark. Plain meaning interpretive components 
are default rules.31 They do not require that parties actually agree that the 
writing will be interpreted according to its plain meaning, but automatically 
attach that consequence to the parties’ agreement that the writing serve as a 
final statement of terms. It might well be that the interpretive components of 
some parol evidence rules are designed to effectuate what most parties would 
agree to if they considered the issue. But the resulting interpretive rule is not 
a product of the parties’ agreement to it.
I do not want to overstate the claim here. A parol evidence rule need 
not include an interpretive component.32 In fact, in its 1986 Report the Law 
30 2 WillisTon, supra note 3, at § 606, 1165.
31 “Default rules” because parties could presumably contract out of plain meaning 
interpretation by expressing their intention that the agreement be interpreted in 
light of the surrounding context. Such clauses are rare, but not unheard of. In 
Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., for example, the Maine Supreme Court considered 
an employment agreement that “specified that the terms of the contract were 
to be interpreted in good faith on the basis of what is reasonable and intended, 
and not technically.” Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 167 A. 79, 80 (Me. 1933).
32 There is some confusion among authorities on the interpretive component of 
U.S. parol evidence rules. In the first edition of his treatise, Williston advocated 
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Commission rejected the idea that under English law integrated writings 
were subject to separate rules of interpretation.33 So with respect to English 
law, the Law Commission may be correct on this issue. But the broader point 
remains: the legal effects of an agreement to integrate need not be identical 
to the content of that agreement. Where they are not, a parol evidence rule is 
not merely an application of the general principles of contract law.
Third, and most significantly for my purposes, if integration is a matter 
of agreement there must also be a legal rule for how parties can or must 
express their agreement to integrate for it to be legally effective.34 That is, an 
agreement-based parol evidence rule must include a mechanism of choice.
U.S. courts recognize two ways parties can effectively express or evince 
their shared intent to integrate. First, parties can include in the writing an 
integration clause. An integration clause states that the writing is the final 
statement of some or all terms. For example:
This instrument embodies the whole agreement of the parties. There 
are no promises, terms, conditions, or obligations other than those 
contained in this contract, and this contract shall supersede all previous 
communications, representations, or agreements, either verbal or written, 
between the parties.35
a plain meaning rule for integrated agreements. See 2 WillisTon, supra note 
3, at § 606, 1164-67. Corbin rejected that interpretive rule on the theory that 
meaning can never be plain except in context. See 3 arThur linTon corBin, 
corBin on conTracTs: a coMprehensive TreaTise on The rules of conTracT 
laW § 536, 27-28 (1951); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and 
the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 cornell l.q. 161, 173 (1965) [hereinafter Corbin, 
The Interpretation of Words]. Section 212 of the Second Restatement adopts 
something like a middle path. Section 212(1) suggests no plain meaning rule: 
“The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the 
terms of the writing or writings in the light of the circumstances.” Section 212(2), 
however, specifies that in the absence of ambiguity, meaning is to be decided 
by the court. resTaTeMenT (seconD) of conTracTs § 212 (aM. laW insT. 1981). 
Farnsworth argues that this is still a plain meaning rule, as it involves a two-step 
process: first deciding whether there is an ambiguity (under the Restatement, in 
light of all the evidence) and, if there is no ambiguity, a judicial decision based 
on the writing’s plain meaning. 2 farnsWorTh, supra note 18, at § 7.12, 314-15.
33 laW coMMission reporT, supra note 22, at §§ 1.2 & 2.7, 2 & 8.
34 Putting the question in these terms clarifies that the parol evidence rule also 
includes a default. According to the blackletter law, the generic default is that 
a writing is not integrated.
35 IA saMuel WillisTon, a TreaTise on The laW of conTracTs: forMs § 33F:2, 
170 (4th ed. 1990).
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I will call this the “express prong” of U.S. integration rules. Second, if the 
writing contains no integration clause, a court will look to whether it appears to 
be intended as a final statement of some or all terms. “Where the parties reduce 
an agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity 
reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated 
agreement.”36 I will call this the “implied prong.” Just as a contractual agreement 
can be either express or implied-in-fact, so an agreement to integrate can 
be either express or implied. A writing that contains an integration clause is 
expressly integrated. When the parties have not expressed their agreement to 
integrate in words, but the character of the writing indicates such an agreement, 
the writing is impliedly integrated.
Although U.S. courts broadly agree on the two prongs of the integration 
rule, they differ on what evidence a decision maker may consider when 
determining the parties’ intent to integrate. The integration components of 
more formalist, or “harder,” parol evidence rules — often associated with 
Williston — provide that if the writing appears on its face intended to be a 
final statement of some or all the parties’ obligations, it is integrated.37 That 
is, a writing alone can suffice to demonstrate its integration, even if there 
exists contrary parol evidence. Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent vel 
non to integrate is admitted only if the writing alone does not answer the 
question. The integration components of less formalist, or “softer,” parol 
evidence rules — associated with Corbin — are quicker to permit extrinsic 
evidence. The decision maker should always consider all available evidence 
of the parties’ intent, even if the writing appears to be integrated — in fact, 
even if it includes an integration clause.38 The Second Restatement adopts 
Corbin’s approach: “A writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness.”39
The current edition of Williston’s treatise acknowledges that the Second 
Restatement adopts a soft integration rule, but reports that the majority rule is 
36 resTaTeMenT (seconD) of conTracTs § 209(3) (aM. laW insT. 1981).
37 “[T]he contract must appear on its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol 
evidence of additional terms.” WillisTon, supra note 3, at § 633, 1226.
38 “If the offered evidence is relevant and credible on the issue of . . . . integration, 
it should never be excluded, for the reason that, whatever are the written words, 
those issues are always debatable.” Corbin, The Interpretation of Words, supra note 
32, at 173. See also Corbin, supra note 21, at 642 (“Just as no written document 
can prove its own execution, so none can prove that it was ever assented to as 
either a partial or a complete integration, supplanting and discharging what 
preceded it.”).
39 resTaTeMenT (seconD) of conTracTs § 210 cmt. b (aM. laW insT. 1981).
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a hard one.40 The most recent edition of E. Allan Farnsworth’s treatise, on the 
contrary, suggests that “the prevailing view [is] that other evidence, including 
evidence of prior negotiations, is still admissible to show that a writing was 
not intended as a final expression of the terms it contains.”41 Under either rule, 
extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show an invalidating cause such as 
misrepresentation, duress or mistake.
To summarize this third point, the express and implied prongs identify 
two ways parties can effectively express their intent to integrate. Hard or soft 
evidentiary rules further specify what evidence courts may consider when 
determining whether the parties have satisfied one or the other prong.42 Pace 
the Law Commission Report, none of these rules can be deduced from the 
general principles of contract law. They govern what parties must say or do 
to achieve a specific legal outcome: an integrated writing. They are legally 
established mechanisms of integration.
The Law Commission was therefore wrong to conclude that because 
integration is a matter of agreement, the so-called parol evidence rule is 
not a distinct rule of law. First, it is not a given that parties should have the 
power to determine a writing’s legal effect. The fact that the law grants them 
that power is itself a substantive rule. Second, depending on the jurisdiction, 
integration can also have legal effects that extend beyond the content of the 
parties’ agreement. An agreement that the writing shall be a final statement 
of terms might trigger a plain meaning rule, a legal effect that does not stem 
from the parties’ agreement. Third, parol evidence rules commonly specify 
not only that parties have the power to integrate a writing by agreement, but 
also how they can effectively express their agreement to integrate, and what 
evidence legal decision makers may consider when determining whether the 
parties have reached such an agreement. These legally determined mechanisms 
of choice are again more than local applications of general contract principles.
III. IntegratIon rules and sPheres of contractIng
The above discussion follows the vast majority of judicial statements and 
scholarly discussions by treating the parol evidence rule as one rule for all 
contractual agreements. It also identifies, however, some of the design decisions 
40 11 saMuel WillisTon, supra note 35, at § 33:17, 969-74 (“Evidence on the issue 
of whether an integration exists; traditional and modern views.”).
41 farnsWorTh, supra note 18, at § 7.3, 227.
42 An even more complete and complex description of integration rules would also 
discuss the fact that there are rules for both partial and complete integration, 
and that these might differ from one another.
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that go into a parol evidence rule. Parol evidence rules do not simply flow 
from general principles of contract law. The fact that parties have the power 
to integrate a writing, the legal effects of integration, and the rules for how 
parties can exercise the power to integrate each represent a design choice. 
That, in turn suggests the possibility of designing different parol evidence 
rules — and particularly different integration rules — for different spheres 
of contracting.
There is some evidence that courts already apply the parol evidence rule 
differentially depending on who the parties are or the type of transaction they 
are engaged in. In 1972, Robert Childres and Stephen Spitz reported a study 
of 149 cases in which they found courts more likely to apply the rule strictly 
to contracts between parties with some expertise and business sophistication, 
and less likely to apply it strictly to contracts between parties lacking such 
sophistication.43 And though not a comparative study, the Reporters for the 
American Law Institute’s draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts 
state that they find the vast majority of courts applying a soft parol evidence 
rule to consumer contracts — holding that a presumption of integration is 
rebuttable, whether or not the writing contains an integration clause.44
This Part argues that there are good reasons to adopt different parol evidence 
rules for different spheres of contracting. I discuss two spheres: negotiated 
contracts between firms and consumer contracts. The method is top down. 
Rather than look at how courts in fact apply the rule in each of these spheres, I 
ask what rule they should apply. I begin by describing the social values at stake 
and the mechanics of consent in each sphere. I then ask what parol evidence 
rule would best serve those values given those mechanics, paying particular 
attention to the mechanisms of choice for integration — in other words, the 
integration components of the rules. (I do not address other design questions, 
such as the best rule for determining when a parol term is contrary to those in 
the writing, or whether the parol evidence rules for such transactions should 
include interpretive components.) This analysis suggests parol evidence 
43 Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 n.y.u. l. 
rev. 1 (1972). See also Michael A. Lawrence, Comment, The Parol Evidence 
Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the Law of Contract, Revisited, 1991 Wis. l. rev. 
1071 (replicating Childres and Spitz’s results with a set of Wisconsin cases 
decided between 1980 and 1991).
44 resTaTeMenT of The laW, consuMer conTracTs § 8 Reporters’ Notes, at 94-96 
(aM. laW insT., Discussion Draft No. 4, 2017) (hereinafter “DrafT consuMer 
conTracTs resTaTeMenT”). For some concerns about the empirical methods used 
in the draft Restatement, see Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies 
in the Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 yale J. reg. 45 (2019).
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rules for these spheres that significantly differ from the common generic 
formulations of the rule, and from one another.45
A. Negotiated Contracts Between Firms
Consider first transactions in which two large firms negotiate the details of 
a high-value exchange. To keep things simple, I will help myself to Alan 
Schwartz and Robert Scott’s description of such exchanges.46 Whether or not 
correct in all its details, their account provides a useful model to work with.
The transactions Schwartz and Scott analyze have three salient characteristics. 
First, both parties are sophisticated, meaning that each has the knowledge and 
reasoning capacity to identify the terms that best serve its interests. “Firms 
and markets are structured so as to minimize the likelihood of systematic 
cognitive error by important decision makers within the firm.”47 Second, a 
firm’s primary goal is to maximize shareholder returns, which it achieves by 
maximizing its own profits.48 Third, in a transaction between two firms, the 
way each maximizes its individual profit is by maximizing the joint surplus, 
which will be split between them according to each firm’s exogenously 
determined bargaining power.49 In addition to these three features, I will 
limit my analysis to contracts in which a significant number of terms have 
been negotiated. This excludes, for example, an adhesive end-user license 
agreement that might exist between two firms by virtue of an employee’s 
decision to update a software package. I am interested in written agreements 
that both sides have read and understood. This is the case when firms have 
negotiated a significant number of terms.
I am also going to help myself to Schwartz and Scott’s thesis that society 
enforces agreements between firms for the same reasons firms enter into 
45 Eric Posner has also recommended a tailored parol evidence rule. But he considers 
only the decision between hard and soft versions of the rule. “[W]hen contracts 
are conventional and complex, soft-PER is optimal . . . . When contracts are 
unconventional and simple, hard-PER is optimal.” Eric A. Posner, The Parol 
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual 
Interpretation, 146 u. pa. l. rev. 533, 553 (1998).
46 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 yale l.J. 541 (2003).
47 Id. at 545-46. Schwartz and Scott suggest the following rough-and-ready rule 
for which firms meet this description: “(1) an entity that is organized in the 
corporate form and that has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, 
or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm.”
48 Id. at 550-51.
49 Id. at 549.
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them, namely, to secure the greatest gains of trade possible.50 Society does 
not enforce agreements between firms because, for example, such agreements 
generate a moral obligation to perform, because their breach creates a moral 
obligation to compensate, or because they generate intrinsically valuable 
relationships or forms of community. Society enforces them because doing 
so increases overall welfare.
This similarity between society’s reasons for enforcing firm-to-firm 
agreements and firms’ reasons for entering into them, together with the 
assumption that firms are sophisticated in the sense defined above, entails that 
when firms pursue their own ends they will choose contract terms that also 
advance society’s reasons for enforcing their contracts. Contract law should 
therefore be designed, generally speaking, to give firms both the first-order 
and the framework terms that they want; hence the observed congruence 
between efficiency and autonomy theories of contract law.51
All this provides support for an agreement-based parol evidence rule for 
contracts between firms. In this sphere and under the above assumptions, we 
should want courts to treat a writing as integrated if and only if the parties 
intended it to be a final statement of some or all terms. What this means at the 
design level is crafting an integration rule that gives firms maximal power to 
determine when a writing is integrated. Contract law should provide firms a 
cheap, fast and predictable mechanism for determining a writing’s legal effects.52
It is odd that U.S. law does not give sophisticated parties a formality to 
signal their intent to integrate. The parol evidence rule confers on parties a legal 
power. It enables them to determine a writing’s legal effects by expressing their 
shared intent that it serve as a final statement of terms. A short, canonical form 
with which to express that intent would be extremely useful. Karl Llewellyn, 
no advocate of formalism writ large, recognized that “a business economy 
demands a means of quick, not one of ‘informal’ contracting.”53 Although 
50 Id. at 546 (arguing that it is futile “to pursue either distributional goals or 
contractual fairness” in contracts between firms, as “firms will contract away 
from redistributive or fair legal rules that do not maximize joint surplus”).
51 E.g., Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in philosophical 
founDaTions of conTracT laW 17, 21-24 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas, & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
52 The following analysis assumes that the default is that a writing between firms 
is not integrated. This is the current rule, and makes a fair bit of sense. Firms 
produce many writings during the course of negotiations. It would be strange 
to expect them to say for each one that it is not intended to be a final statement 
of terms.
53 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? — An Essay in Perspective, 40 yale 
l.J. 704, 741 (1931). Llewellyn pointed to empirical evidence in support: 
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form books are full of model integration clauses, there exists in U.S. law no 
canonical formula, comparable to “F.O.B.” or “as is,” that parties can use to 
integrate a writing. The seal once served something like that function, and 
still does in some jurisdictions. But the seal was always a blunt instrument, 
as putting a writing under seal had other legal effects as well.54 A legally 
efficacious formality — such as printing the words “Legally Operative Statement 
of All Terms” or “Legally Operative Statement of Included Terms” at the top 
of a document — would provide parties who wish to integrate the writing a 
useful tool for doing so. The fact that U.S. law includes no such formality is 
a historical accident, perhaps attributable to a general movement away from 
formalities in the early twentieth century, the period during which the modern, 
agreement-based parol evidence rule came into existence.
Given that U.S. law does not include an integration formality, what should 
the integration rule for negotiated contracts between firms be? Recall that 
integration rules in U.S. jurisdictions have two prongs. To satisfy the express 
prong, the parties must include in the writing an integration clause; to satisfy 
the implied prong, it must appear from the writing as a whole that the parties 
intended it as a final statement of some or all terms.
An express integration rule provides firms a cheap and certain means of 
effectively expressing their intent to integrate. If two firms negotiate a writing 
that includes an integration clause, courts should at least presumptively treat 
the writing as integrated. The only question is whether they should consider 
extrinsic evidence that might suggest a contrary result — whether the express 
prong should be a hard or soft rule.
A number of efficiency-minded scholars have applied cost-benefit analysis 
to argue that sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretive approaches 
generally.55 Under the above assumptions, cost-benefit analysis is appropriate 
“[W]hen we see the great exchanges devising means for exchanging written 
and signed memoranda of sales of grain and stocks — and, so far as an outsider 
can determine, profiting by the necessity — the notion that speed requires 
utter informality loses cogency.” Id. at 740. See also Richard Craswell, Offer, 
Acceptance and Efficient Reliance, 48 sTan. l. rev. 481, 544-53 (1996).
54 Llewellyn makes this point too, arguing that the problem with the seal as not 
the seal itself, but “the persistence of archaic and arbitrary incidents in promises 
effective purely through their ancient form.” Llewellyn, supra note 53, at 739.
55 See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 53, at 544-53; Kraus & Scott, supra note 25; 
Posner, supra note 45; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 46; Robert E. Scott, The 
Case for Formalism in Relational Contracts, 94 nW. u. l. rev. 847 (2000); 
Robert E. Scott, Text versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of Contract 
Interpretation, in The aMerican illness: essays on The rule of laW 312, 321-
24 (F.H. Buckley ed., 2013).
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in this sphere, for by maximizing joint gains, cost-benefit analysis advances 
both the goals of firms and the goals of society in enforcing their agreements. 
If these writers are correct, it follows that firms are better served by a hard 
express integration prong.
Avery Katz has argued that such cost-benefit arguments for textualism writ 
large are more difficult than commonly assumed. The problem is that we lack 
good empirical data about key variables.56 These include the relative costs 
of drafting and of adjudication under various rules, parties’ responsiveness 
to legal rules of construction, the accuracy gains that can be expected from 
permitting extrinsic evidence of meaning, and whether permitting extrinsic 
evidence makes outcomes more or less predictable. I agree with Katz that we 
lack the empirical data to know whether textualism is more efficient generally. 
But I believe the cost-benefit analysis is more tractable for a narrower question: 
Should courts consider extrinsic evidence when construing an integration 
clause in a negotiated writing between firms? To keep things relatively simple, 
I focus on four variables: (1) interpretive accuracy, or how likely a third-party 
adjudicator’s interpretation is to match the parties’ actual agreement; (2) costs 
of drafting; (3) costs of adjudication; and (4) predictability of outcomes.57
In negotiated transactions, both parties have taken some care to read the 
writing. And if both parties are firms, in the sense defined above, they have 
understood it. Absent fraud, duress or some other invalidating cause, the 
existence of an integration clause is therefore extremely strong evidence that 
the parties intended the writing to be a final statement of terms. Neither firm 
is likely to have agreed to the language by mistake. Nor are courts likely to 
56 Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract 
Interpretation, 104 coluM. l. rev. 496, 538 (2004) (“[T]he traditional scholarly 
approach to form and substance founders on a lack of information about the 
likely consequences of formal and substantive modes of interpretation.”). A 
natural solution in such circumstance is to let sophisticated parties decide for 
themselves, on the assumption that they generally know more than lawmakers do 
about which framework rules serve their interests. That solution is not available, 
however, for the integration rule — which is in part a rule for deciding how the 
parties have decided which interpretive approach they prefer. Even if we want 
to allow parties to choose how their choices are to be interpreted, we still need 
a rule for determining when and how they have exercised that choice.
57 I am using “interpretive accuracy” to refer both to the absence of adjudicative 
error — when a court misreads the parties’ expressed intent — and to the absence 
of party error — when the parties fail to express themselves as the legal rule 
requires for their desired result. For other lists of relevant factors, see Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 yale l.J. 926, 
941 (2010); Katz, supra note 56, at 522-36; Posner, supra note 45, at 543-47.
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mistake an integration clause’s meaning — the legal effect the parties intend. 
Permitting extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to integrate would therefore 
result in few gains in accuracy. It is true that excluding such evidence might 
cause some parties to invest more at the drafting stage, so as to ensure that the 
integration clause unambiguously expresses their intent to integrate (costs a 
canonical formality would reduce). But there exist many form clauses to copy 
and paste, and any increase in drafting cost is likely offset by the advantage 
of lower adjudication costs, greater accuracy and greater predictability. With 
respect to express integration between firms, then, the largest gains come from 
excluding extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to integrate, except when 
introduced to show fraud, duress or some other invalidating cause.
All this suggests a hard express integration rule for firm-to-firm negotiated 
contracts: A writing is integrated if it includes an integration clause, regardless 
of any extrinsic evidence to the contrary. What about when the writing does 
not include an integration clause? Should the integration rule for negotiated 
contracts between firms also include an implied prong?
There is a good argument that, on the above assumptions, implied integration 
is out of place in contracts between firms. The law does not recognize implied 
arbitration, implied damage limitation, implied no-modification or implied 
anti-waiver clauses. It is more than a little strange that it recognizes implied 
integration. Call an integration rule that requires parties to expressly state 
their intent to integrate a “strict express integration rule.” A strict express 
integration rule does not include an implied prong. There are two reasons to 
think firms would do better with such a rule.
First, absent an integration clause, interpretation of the parties’ intent to 
integrate is likely to be more expensive, less accurate, and more difficult to 
predict. Rather than enforce the writing’s express terms, a court must infer 
what the parties probably intended its legal effect to be — either from the 
writing alone (a hard implied integration rule) or from the writing plus extrinsic 
evidence (a soft implied integration rule). In either case, the evidence will be 
circumstantial at best, which means outcomes that are both less predictable 
and more prone to error. And the interpretation of implied meanings is always 
more resource-intensive and less certain than is the interpretation of express 
ones. One might guess that on this basis alone sophisticated parties, who 
value cheap, accurate and predictable adjudication, are likely to say when 
they intend a writing to be integrated.
Second, firms are ex hypothesi highly responsive to legal rules. Just as we 
can expect a plain meaning rule to cause sophisticated parties to invest more 
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to express their agreement clearly,58 so a strict express integration rule will 
make it all the more likely that sophisticated parties will add an integration 
clause to writings they intend to be final statements of terms, especially since 
the costs of doing so are so low. If the law were to require firms who wish 
to integrate a writing to say so, the vast majority would, under the above 
assumptions, do just that, adding to the rule’s advantages.
Of course a strict express integration rule would increase drafting costs. 
And some parties who intend a writing to be a final statement of terms might 
forget to say so in it. But those costs should be weighed against the potentially 
large gains in accuracy and predictability, as well as reduced litigation costs. 
So long as firms are largely responsive to the integration rule, there seems 
little to be gained and much to be lost by recognizing implied integration.
To my knowledge, no one who recommends formalist rules of interpretation 
for agreements between firms has suggested a formalist integration rule of 
this type. Eric Posner, who advocates a hard parol evidence rule for certain 
categories of transactions, does not say that those parties should be required to 
express in words their intent to integrate.59 Jody Kraus and Robert Scott argue 
that courts should respect parties’ choice of framework rules, or “contractual 
means,” including their choice of a rule of interpretation. But when Kraus 
and Scott discuss the parol evidence rule, they simply state that courts “have 
devised various neutral tests for determining whether parties intended to 
integrate part or all of their agreement into a final, legally enforceable writing.”60 
And though Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recommend a hard integration 
rule for agreements between firms,61 they also support the “presumption . . 
. . that the contract is fully integrated if it appears final and complete on its 
58 See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 46, at 572; Scott, Text versus Context, 
supra note 55, at 322-23.
59 Posner, supra note 45.
60 Kraus & Scott, supra note 25, at 1047. See also id. at 1052 n.124 (“Courts have 
long recognized that a writing can be found to be a total integration even in the 
absence of a merger clause.”). The appellate case Kraus and Scott use to illustrate 
how the parol evidence rule should work dealt with a writing that seems not 
to have included an integration clause. Id. at 1053-62 (discussing Hunt Foods 
and Ind. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1966)). The lower court in the 
case had applied a soft implied integration rule, concluding that the writing was 
integrated based on the circumstances surrounding its execution. Hunt Foods 
& Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 49 Misc. 2d 246, 249 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), rev’d, 26 
A.D.2d 41 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
61 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 46, at 589-90. 
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face,” and argue that such a rule “maximizes party discretion over the content 
of the legally enforceable contract.”62
It is a little odd for these formalists to adopt such anti-formalist integration 
rules. In firm-to-firm transactions, party control over integration is not maximized 
by a rule that allows courts to make judgment calls absent an express statement 
of the parties’ intent to integrate. Exactly the opposite. Assuming arguendo 
that the evidence supports formalism writ large in this sphere, it also supports 
requiring firms that want to integrate a writing to say so. That is, it supports 
a strict express integration rule.
B. Consumer Contracts
A consumer contract is a contract between an individual buyer acting primarily 
in her private capacity — the consumer — and a business that regularly sells 
goods, services, software or other products to such individuals. In a typical 
consumer contract, the business drafts a set of standard terms without consumer 
input. The business then gives those standard terms, which are often lengthy 
and written in technical language, to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
The consumer pays attention not to the standard terms, but to a few primary 
terms, such as the price and the description of the product — how well the 
product will work, its entertainment value, how long it will last, etc. Whereas 
the primary terms are put in front of the consumer’s eyes, the standard terms 
are listed separately in an accompanying document or on a linked webpage, or 
they arrive later with the product. The consumer, who is focused on primary 
terms, almost never reads or comprehends the standard terms, but indicates 
her assent to them by signing at the bottom of a long document, by clicking 
a HTML button labeled “I agree,” by completing the transaction to which the 
terms are appended, or by not cancelling the transaction when the terms arrive.
There are important differences between the mechanics of choice in consumer 
contracts and those in negotiated contracts between firms. In a consumer 
contract, the parties arrive at the transaction with different incentives, knowledge 
and cognitive abilities. Businesses that sell to consumers are repeat players. 
As such, it makes sense for them to invest significant resources, including 
attorney time, in drafting the standard terms they give to consumers, so as to 
ensure that those terms serve the business’s interests. Consumers do not hire 
lawyers to read the standard terms they are given, and typically do not have 
the legal sophistication necessary to fully understand them. And because most 
consumer transactions are low-value, the risks of significant harm slight, and 
the business’s terms adhesive, it is not rational for the consumer to invest the 
62 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 57, at 960.
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resources it would take to understand the business’s standard terms. It is not 
rational for consumers to read, and in fact most do not.63 Thus on one side 
of a consumer contract is a business sophisticated enough to draft standard 
terms that serve its interests, and on the other is a consumer who has not 
read or understood those terms. As the Reporters for the draft Restatement 
of the Law of Consumer Contracts state, this “asymmetry in information, 
sophistication, and stakes between the parties to the contract” presents a 
fundamental challenge to the law of contracts.64
Although the mechanics of choice in consumer contracts differ from those 
in negotiated contracts between firms, the values at stake are similar. Dagan 
and Heller observe that consumers do not typically want rich relationships 
with the businesses that sell to them. For consumers, these transactions “are 
like errands whose friction needs to be minimized if contract is to be loyal 
to its ultimate normative commitment to autonomy as self-determination.”65 
Moreover, when the business is a firm whose primary goal is to maximize 
its own returns, it would be a mistake for the consumer to think she was 
entering into a morally thick relationship. Thus Dagan and Heller suggest 
that consumer contract law be structured to “prevent[] firms from (ab)using 
consumers’ misconceptions of being morally bound to comply with, rather 
than challenge, unfavorable conditions.”66 The value of a typical consumer 
contract is not the relationship it creates between the consumer and a business, 
but the welfare gains to each party. In this respect, consumer contracts are 
not so different from negotiated contracts between firms: the law should seek 
to help both sides maximize the gains of trade. Or so I will assume in the 
analysis that follows.
The asymmetries between the parties to a consumer transaction, however, 
suggest that considerations of fairness are more salient in this sphere than they 
are in firm-to-firm transactions. Whereas a firm has the capacity to secure its 
share of any surpluses of trade, it is not obvious that consumers are always in 
a position to do so, at least insofar as unread standard terms affect the division. 
63 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating 
the Recommendations of the ALI’s ‘Principles of the Law of Software Contracts’, 
78 u. chi. l. rev 165 (2011) (finding that almost no consumers read online 
contracts); Margaret Jane Radin, Taking Notice Seriously: Information Delivery 
and Consumer Contract Formation, 17 TheoreTical inquiries l. 515 (2016) 
(describing reasons to doubt that effective notice to consumers is possible).
64 DrafT consuMer conTracTs resTaTeMenT, supra note 44, Reporters’ Introduction, 
at 1.
65 Dagan & heller, supra note 1, at 81.
66 Id. (citing Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract, 163 u. pa. 
l. rev. 2109 (2015)).
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Hence the commonly felt need for oversight of such terms, whether ex ante 
by regulating permissible terms or ex post by judicial review for substantive 
unconscionability.
So what should a parol evidence rule for consumer contracts look like? 
The mechanics of choice in this sphere, and especially the fact that consumers 
do not read standard terms, suggest that there is little point to adopting an 
agreement-based parol evidence rule — a rule that conditions integration on 
the parties’ shared intent that a writing serve as a final statement of terms. 
Consumers care about price and product features. It is almost impossible 
to get them to pay attention to standard terms.67 This general truth almost 
certainly applies to technical terms like integration clauses. No matter what 
the mechanisms of choice, the mechanics of consumer choice mean that most 
consumers will not be aware of or understand a contractual provision stating 
that the standard terms are integrated. Uncomprehending agreement provides 
no obvious benefits.68
That said, there are good reasons to treat a business’s written standard 
terms as integrated against at least some forms of extrinsic evidence. Those 
reasons derive from the argument for permitting businesses to set standard 
terms in the first place. Standardization can, under the right conditions, benefit 
both businesses and consumers. Standardizing terms allows a business to save 
resources by spreading the costs of drafting over many transactions and by 
regularizing its performance obligations. In a competitive market, we can 
expect the business to pass at least some of those savings on to consumers 
in the form of a lower price.
Of course there is the worry that permitting businesses to unilaterally set 
standard terms might harm consumers — the fairness concern noted above. 
Even if the happy story about lower prices is true, there is no guarantee for 
any given standard term that the resulting price reduction will exceed its 
substantive costs to consumers. If, for example, an arbitration clause with a 
class-arbitration waiver effectively prevents consumers from enforcing their 
67 For a vivid illustration, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam S. Chilton, Simplification 
of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test, 45 legal sTuD. 541 (2016) (finding 
that warning boxes highlighting terms many consumers might find important 
had little effect on consumer comprehension, decision making or understanding 
of their legal rights).
68 In fact, agreement without understanding can have negative consequences. Thus 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan has suggested that consumers’ agreement to predictably and 
rationally unread terms can cause them to believe that they are bound by terms 
to which they might otherwise object and which might be legally unenforceable. 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 
103 cornell l. rev. 117 (2017).
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legal rights, it is not obvious that consumers come out ahead, even if they pay 
a somewhat lower price as a result. And standard terms might have negative 
externalities or offend our sense of fairness in other ways.
If we are worried that businesses will use their unilateral power to impose 
inefficient or unfair terms, the solution is not to insist that consumers make 
more informed choices. All the evidence suggests that the mechanics of 
consumer choice are relatively fixed. A mechanism has not yet been invented 
that will secure consumer comprehension of terms. The solution is, rather, to 
set substantive limits on the content of the standard terms firms can choose, 
either through ex ante regulation, e.g., with lists of mandatory or prohibited 
terms, which one finds in European law, or ex post judicial scrutiny, in the 
United States most commonly by way of the unconscionability defense.
Assume for the sake of argument that we have or could construct a system 
of substantive checks that permits businesses to set standard terms in a 
way that increases welfare on both sides. (This is an admittedly ambitious 
assumption. But what else could justify the existing practice of enforcing 
terms set unilaterally by businesses?) Such a system can realize the advantages 
of standardization only if individual consumers do not have the power to 
alter a business’s standard terms. The general rules of contract construction, 
however, can permit just that. Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, for example, if one party makes a counter proposal with different or 
additional terms, subsequent performance by the other can either operate as 
an acceptance of those terms or, in some circumstances, extinguish contrary 
terms in the earlier offer.69 Under such a rule, a consumer might alter a 
business’s standard terms by sending the business a pre-purchase message 
proposing an alternative term, knowing the message will likely be lost in 
the shuffle of corporate bureaucracy. If the business then fulfills the order, it 
might unwittingly accept those terms or alter its own. Though the individual 
consumer might benefit from having her proposed term included in the 
agreement or having the business’s standard term deleted, the result would be 
a system of contracting that would ultimately cost all consumers. The costs 
would come from a combination of business-side expenses associated with 
the nonstandard terms and business-side policies designed to protect against 
such consumer-side modifications. In a competitive market, both costs would 
be passed on to consumers in the price. In short, if standard terms can benefit 
all parties, then a rule that thwarts individual consumer attempts to modify 
standard terms benefits both consumers and businesses.
69 The above is a much-simplified description of the rule in U.C.C. § 2-207 (aM. 
laW insT. & unif. laW coMM’n 2002).
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All this suggests treating standard terms in consumer contracts as completely 
integrated against consumer-side communications. In other words, a consumer 
should not be permitted to introduce her own extrinsic communications as 
evidence of terms that are contrary or additional to the business’s standard 
terms.
What about business-side communications? Such communications might 
include parol representations to consumers generally, such as in mass advertising, 
or parol agreements that the business’s agents might enter into with a single 
consumer. A business might have good reasons to want to integrate standard 
terms against such parol communications. It might, for example, want to 
protect itself against the risk that one of its employees will misrepresent to 
a consumer the standard terms, or make promises or assurances that extend 
beyond those terms. Integration can reduce such agency costs, producing 
savings that the business can pass on to consumers in the form of lower prices.
These considerations might be compelling if consumers typically read and 
relied on standard terms or understood that standard terms are integrated, putting 
them on notice not to take parol statements seriously. But we know that neither 
is the case. When it comes to rogue agents, businesses are the cheapest cost 
avoiders. We can expect much better results if businesses undertake the costs 
of training and monitoring to ensure that employee communications accord 
with standard terms, rather than relying on consumers to read standard terms 
and recognize when not to rely on an employee’s promises or representations. 
The example illustrates a broader principle. As the Reporters for the draft 
Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts put the point, “Since the 
standard contract terms do not represent a joint effort by both parties of 
drafting and memorializing a negotiated agreement, there is less justification 
to allow them to override business-side affirmations or promises made to the 
consumer.”70 In fact, it is difficult to see why a predictably unread standard 
term in a consumer contract should ever prevent the enforcement of other 
affirmations or promises that the consumer is likely to see and understand.
The upshot of the above discussion is threefold. First, the mechanics of 
choice in the sphere of consumer contracts militate against an agreement-based 
integration rule. Whether standard terms are integrated should not depend on 
70 DrafT consuMer conTracTs resTaTeMenT, supra note 44, § 8 cmt. 3. The draft 
Restatement’s treatment of the parol evidence rule has shifted over time. As of 
the final substantive edits to this Article, the most recently published version was 
the April 17, 2017 Discussion Draft. Section 8 in that draft described a multipart 
parol evidence rule that differs significantly from the rule recommended in this 
section. A subsequent samizdat and as of yet unpublished draft has a revised 
section 8 that better accords with the analysis in this section.
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the parties’ shared intent to integrate.71 Second, there is a plausible welfarist 
argument for treating all standard terms as completely integrated against 
consumer-side communications. Third, the mechanics of consumer choice 
also suggest that standard terms never be integrated against communications 
by the business. Together these points suggest for consumer contracts a 
mandatory or default rule that standard terms are completely integrated 
against consumer-side communications, and a mandatory rule that they are 
not integrated against business-side communications. If the consumer-side 
component of the rule is a default, a business could opt-out of it by including 
something like an anti-integration clause in its standard terms — though it is 
not obvious why any business would want to do so. Under no circumstances, 
however, should a business be able to integrate its standard terms against its 
own communications. That is, the limited effect of any integration should 
be mandatory.
* * *
The above analysis suggests that the generic parol evidence rules on the books 
are ill-suited both to negotiated contracts between firms and to consumer 
contracts. With respect to the former, we would do better with a hard strict 
express integration rule, one that requires firms to express their agreement 
to integrate a writing in words and that treats such words as dispositive. 
With respect to the latter, we would do better by rejecting an agreement-
based integration rule and treating standard terms as automatically integrated 
against extrinsic consumer-side communications and never integrated against 
extrinsic business-side communications. The reasons for these different rules 
do not turn on differences between the values at stake in these spheres of 
contracting. Those values largely overlap. They turn instead on the mechanics 
of choice in each sphere, which recommend different mechanisms of choice 
and sometimes restricting parties’ ability to choose.
71 Wigmore, who was influential in establishing the modern agreement-based parol 
evidence rule, also recognized that some types of legal documents are subject 
to “compulsory integration,” in which case the parties’ agreement to integrate is 
unnecessary. See WigMore, supra note 19, at §§ 2450-53, 3455-64 (discussing 
“Integration required by Law”).
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conclusIon: IMPlIcatIons for a choIce  
theory of contract
The above analysis illustrates the value of attending both to the mechanics 
of choice and to the legal mechanisms of choice when thinking about how 
one might tailor legal rules to the different spheres of contracting. Dagan 
and Heller argue that “application of familiar contract concepts . . . . should 
vary depending on the normative concerns driving different contract types.”72 
But even if we hold normative concerns constant — as the above analyses of 
negotiated contracts between firms and of consumer contracts largely do — the 
mechanics of choice can recommend varying the rules of contracting. These 
variations can include both differences in the mechanisms of choice that the 
law provides parties and differences in the choices parties are empowered to 
make, including sometimes limiting those choices. More generally, the quality 
of choice matters. Party choice adds value when, given the local mechanics 
of choice, there exist legal mechanisms of choice that in practice enhance 
party autonomy.
The above discussion only begins to address these issues. For one thing, 
parol evidence rules govern, in Dagan and Heller’s vocabulary, parties’ 
ability to choose contract terms, as distinguished from their choice among 
pre-established contract types. The mechanics of choice are also relevant to 
thinking about whether and how the law should provide choice among contract 
types. It is not enough, for example, to simply say that workers should be 
given a choice between being employees and being independent contractors.73 
We need to know more about whether, given the mechanics of choice in this 
sphere, there exist mechanisms that in practice will give workers the ability 
to make valuable choices between those forms.74 The same holds true for 
giving consumers a choice between contract types, as illustrated by Part I’s 
discussion of the consumer opt-out provisions in Texas’s Deceptive Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act.
In addition, the above analysis considers two spheres in which similar 
values are at stake. Maximizing the welfare gains for each party is paramount 
in each. It might be that mechanisms of choice should also vary depending on 
the normative concerns of one or another sphere of contracting. In contexts 
in which we want contract law to support thicker moral relationships or 
forms of community, for example, yet other variations on the parol evidence 
72 Dagan & heller, supra note 1, at 7.
73 Id. at 112.
74 Dagan and Heller recognize something like this concern when they discuss 
possible reasons for limiting freedom of contract. Id. at 130.
486 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 20.2:457
rule might be appropriate. If, for example, society’s reasons for enforcement 
involve the parties’ actual moral obligations to one another, we might want to 
make it more difficult for parties to prevent courts from examining extrinsic 
evidence of their actual agreement.75 A complete choice theory of contract 
would address not only what parties in various contracting spheres should 
be able to choose, but also the mechanisms of choice that best serve the 
normative concerns within each sphere.
Although there remains more to say, the above discussion is enough to 
demonstrate that contract theorists should pay more attention both to the 
mechanics of choice and to the available mechanisms of choice. Dagan and 
Heller say a lot about giving parties the power to choose and the choices 
that should be available to them. They say much less about the mechanics 
and available mechanisms of choice — how parties make legally efficacious 
choices. But it is not enough to argue in the abstract that a commitment to 
party autonomy allows us to resolve conflicts between and disagreements 
about the values within any given sphere of contracts. The availability of 
that solution depends on the actual mechanics and available mechanisms of 
choice within each sphere. Party choice can operate to enhance autonomy and 
resolve competing values only when parties are willing and able to choose. 
Whether and where this is the case is relevant to any theory of contract law, 
including the choice theory.
75 I have elsewhere made a related argument for adopting different legal rules for 
determining parties’ intent to contract in four contexts: gratuitous promises, 
preliminary agreements between firms, agreements between spouses, and reporters’ 
promises of confidentiality. Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 va. l. rev. 
1437, 1469-99 (2009). The law does and should adopt rules for interpreting 
parties’ intent to contract depending on the “different balances between the 
sometimes conflicting reasons the law has for holding promisors liable for their 
breaches.” Id. at 1442.
